«SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 23 • march 2010 DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700 Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue ...»
Governance with/out Government
False Promises or Flawed Premises?
Tanja A. Börzel
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 23 • march 2010
DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700 Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue Formen des Regierens?
DFG Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance?
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series
Edited by the Research Center (SFB) 700 „Governance In Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance?“ The SFB-Governance Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Paper Series should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors.
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Börzel, Tanja A. 2010: Governance with/out Government. False Promises or Flawed Premises? SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 23, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, March 2010.
ISSN 1863-6896 (Print) ISSN 1864-1024 (Internet) This publication has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
DFG Research Center (SFB) 700 Freie Universität Berlin Alfried-Krupp-Haus Berlin Binger Straße 40 14197 Berlin Germany Phone: +49-30-838 58502 Fax: +49-30-838 58540 E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org Web: www.sfb-governance.de SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 23 • March 2010 | 3 Governance with/out Government. False Promises or Flawed Premises?
Tanja A. Börzel Abstract Governance with/out government has emerged as an alternative or functional equivalent to government. While there seems to be an increasing demand, the promise of governance to compensate for the weakness or failure of government rests on a major premise. Governments have to be strong enough so that non-governmental actors have an incentive to cooperate, and governments are not afraid of being captured. If this premise held, it would result in a serious dilemma for areas of limited statehood: The greater the demand for governance with/out government, the less likely it is to emerge and to be effective, precisely because government is weak.
This paper explores to what extent government and statehood are necessary to make governance with/out government work. It discusses various options of how to commit non-governmental actors to the provision of common goods without a shadow of hierarchy cast by government and concludes with suggestions for future research on governance beyond statehood.
Zusammenfassung „Governance with/out government“ wird häufig als funktionales Äquivalent zu staatlichem Regieren gehandelt. Inwiefern nicht-hierarchische Formen des Regierens Staatsversagen kompensieren können, scheint jedoch von einer wesentlichen Prämisse abzuhängen. Regierungen müssen stark genug sein, um Kooperationsanreize für nicht-staatliche Akteure zu erzeugen und gleichzeitig nicht die Gefahr des „state capture“ zu fürchten. Wenn dies zutrifft, ergibt sich daraus ein ernsthaftes Governance Dilemma für Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit.
Je größer die Nachfrage nach „governance with/out government“ desto weniger wahrscheinlich ist es, dass nicht-hierarchische Formen des Regierens sich herausbilden und effektiv sind, gerade weil staatliches Regieren schwach ist.
Das Papier untersucht, inwiefern staatliches Regieren und Staatlichkeit notwendige Bedingungen für die Effektivität von „governance with/out government“ sind. Welche Möglichkeiten gibt es außer dem durch intakte Staatlichkeit erzeugten Schatten der Hierarchie, um nicht-staatliche Akteure zu veranlassen, sich an der Bereitstellung von Governance-Leistungen zu beteiligen?
Governance with/out Government | 4 Contents
1. Introduction1 In recent years, the literature on governance within and beyond the state has focused on nonhierarchical modes of coordination and the involvement of non-governmental actors in the formulation and implementation of public policies. In the 1970s, the comparative policy and politics literature already showed that governance might help to overcome problems of government (for a good overview of the literature see Scharpf 1997; Mayntz/Scharpf 1995a). The direct participation of non-governmental actors in public policy-making would improve both the quality of public policies and the effectiveness of their implementation, since target groups could bring in their expertise and their interests. 20 years later, this argument was reintroduced into the governance literature by students of International Relations and European Politics who have been discussing “governance without government” (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992; Peters/Pierre
1998) and “new modes of governance” (Héritier 2002; Héritier/Lehmkuhl 2008) as functional equivalents to the traditional top-down, command-and-control approach of hierarchical steering by government.
Yet, empirical research has demonstrated that non-hierarchical coordination and the involvement of non-state actors do not necessarily hold their promise to increase the effectiveness and the legitimacy of public policy-making. Governance without government is likely to produce (more) adequate policy outcomes if political decisions can be hierarchically imposed. The “shadow of hierarchy” cast by government provides a crucial incentive for both government and non-governmental actors to engage in non-hierarchical coordination (cf. Mayntz/Scharpf 1995b; Scharpf 1997). If government is indeed a premise for governance without government, this results in a dilemma, if not a paradox, for research on governance – the lower the effectiveness of government, the greater the need for governance, whose effectiveness (and legitimacy) depends, however, on the presence of government.
This paper explores how much government is necessary to make governance work. The question is not only relevant for the realm of international politics, where collective rule-making has been spreading but cannot rely on a central enforcement power to ensure compliance. In “areas of limited statehood”, where government is weak or absent, governance without government may be often the only way to provide common goods (Risse/Lehmkuhl 2010).
The paper starts with conceptualizing the relationship between government and governance.
I will argue that the shadow of hierarchy cast by governments that can draw on consolidated statehood is a major condition for the emergence and effectiveness of governance with and without government. Since the governments of many states outside the OECD world are often too weak to cast a credible shadow of hierarchy, we should not be too surprised why research on transition countries has found only limited evidence on the emergence of governance without 1 I am grateful for comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper to Nicole Bolleyer, Michael Daxner, Nicole Deitelhoff, Thomas Eimer, Gerhard Göhler, Nicole Helmerich, Andrea Liese, Thomas Risse, Fritz Scharpf, Cordt Schmelzle, Vera van Hüllen as well as the participants of the SFB 700 Jour Fixe. Special thanks go to David Budde and Moritz Konradi for editing the paper.
Governance with/out Government | 6 government (cf. Héritier/Rhodes 2010; Börzel 2009a). In the absence of a government that is capable of threatening with hierarchical intervention, business and civil society have few incentives to cooperate. Moreover, governments that command only limited resources themselves have been reluctant to cooperate with non-state actors for fear of agency capture.
In the second part, I will tackle the nature of hierarchy and statehood to explore to what extent government is necessary to cast a credible shadow. The governance literature draws an implicit link between hierarchy, statehood and government. Hierarchy defined as the capacity to impose decisions by coercion is constitutive for government, which can draw on the monopoly of force in the provision of common goods. If governance requires at least some government, governance research is unlikely to travel to areas of limited statehood, where statehood is by definition too weak for governments to hierarchically adopt and enforce collectively binding rules.
Moreover, these countries would be doomed, since governance without government is unlikely to substitute for government failure.
To what extent this governance dilemma really holds true and can be eventually overcome, is after all an empirical question, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the third part of the paper discusses whether the emphasis on government and statehood as scope conditions for effective and legitimate governance may be a fallacy of modernization theory, which has prevented us from conceiving of governance as a true functional equivalent and substitute for, rather than a compliment to, government. The fourth part then discusses possibilities to induce non-governmental actors into the provision of common goods without a shadow of hierarchy cast by government and statehood. The paper concludes with some suggestions for future research on governance beyond statehood.
2. Governance, Government and Hierarchy
Following the work of Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf, governance is understood in this paper as institutionalized modes of coordination through which collectively binding decisions are adopted and implemented to provide common goods (cf. Mayntz/Scharpf 1995b; Mayntz 2004; Scharpf 2000).
Thus, governance consists of both structure and process (Scharpf 1997:
97; Mayntz/Scharpf 1995b: 19). Governance in terms of structure relates to the institutions and actor constellations. Here, the literature usually distinguishes between hierarchy, market (competition systems)2 and networks (negotiation systems).3 These are ideal types, which differ with regard to the type of actors involved and the degree of coupling between them. Governance as 2 In the political science literature, markets are not regarded as governance since they are a “ spontaneous order” (Hayek) that leaves “no place for ‘conscious, deliberate and purposeful’ efforts to craft formal structures” (Williamson 1996: 31). Yet, market mechanisms can be institutionalized to coordinate actors’ behavior through competition (cf. Benz 2007). This paper uses the concept of competition systems to describe the institutionalization of market-based modes of political coordination.
The governance literature has identified other forms of social order, such as clans (cf. Ouchi 1980) and associations (cf. Schmitter/Lehmbruch 1979; Streeck/Schmitter 1985). Like networks, this paper conceptualizes them as negotiation systems (see below).
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 23 • March 2010 | 7 process points to the modes of social coordination by which actors seek to achieve changes in (mutual) behavior. Hierarchical coordination usually takes the form of authoritative decisions (e.g. administrative ordinances, court decisions). Actors must obey. Non-hierarchical coordination, by contrast, is based on voluntary commitment and compliance. Conflicts of interests are solved by negotiations. Voluntary agreement is either achieved by negotiating a compromise and granting mutual concessions (side-payments and issue-linkage) on the basis of fixed preferences (bargaining), or actors engage in processes of non-manipulative persuasion (arguing), through which they develop common interests and change their preferences accordingly (Benz 1994: 118-127; cf. Risse 2000).
Institutions are crucial in shaping both governance structures and governance processes. On the one hand, they determine the degree of coupling between actors by defining their relationships and allocating resources to them. On the other hand, institutions set the framework for the modes of coordination on which actors draw (cf. Scharpf 1997). In hierarchical structures, for instance, hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of coordination can be used. Institutions bestow upon government the power to unilaterally impose decisions, but they can refrain from invoking their hierarchical authority when they bargain or argue with others. Negotiation and competition systems, by contrast, can only rely on bargaining and arguing. Which mode of coordination actors choose within their institutional limits is, again, influenced by institutions, which render certain modes more appropriate or socially acceptable than others.
Institutions also influence the constellations of governance actors since they regulate the resources they can draw upon in the provision of common goods. While governance research seeks to overcome the strict separation between the public and private sphere,4 the distinction between governmental and non-governmental actors remains meaningful, both for normative and theoretical reasons (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995b: 27f ). Unlike private or non-governmental actors (civil society, companies), governments have the authority to hierarchically impose common goods or command their provision by others. The authority of hierarchical coordination is based on the institutionalized monopoly over key power resources (“Herrschaftsressourcen”, Genschel/Zangl 2008: 4), particularly coercive force.5 Non-governmental actors also have the capacity of hierarchical coordination and may monopolize the use of force. However, governments hold an institutionalized (claim to the) monopoly of force that they must put to use for nothing else than the provision of common goods. Thus, governments do not only command privileged resources for hierarchical coordination. Their public mandate commits them to acting in the public interest and makes them politically accountable and legally liable in case of failure (Scharpf 1991: 630).6 In other words, what makes governments special is that they can 4 Governance approaches emphasize mutual interdependence of public and private actors in the provision of common goods defying the classical distinction between the subject and object of steering (cf.
Mayntz/Scharpf 1995b; Mayntz 2005).
5 Other “key monopolies” discussed in the literature are the levy of taxes and administration; (Genschel/ Zangl 2008: 4-6).